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• China’sremarkableincreaseingrossdomestic
product (GDP) and its integration into the
world economy over the past 25 years have
had an enormous impact and have stimulated
intense discussion within the international
community.
• An analysis of the determinants of growth in
China suggests that this rapid growth should
continue and that its importance to the world
economy should therefore increase. The four
major sources of productivity that will
generate growth in China for the foreseeable
future are the continued reallocation of labour
from the agricultural sector to manufacturing,
a more efficient allocation of capital, institutional
reforms, and trade reforms.
• Although China’s integration into the world
economy poses challenges for policy-makers,
both in China and abroad, and will entail
structural changes, the prospect is for
substantial net beneﬁts for Canada and the
global economy. While China’s growth
should result in increased competition for
some labour-intensive Canadian products,
Canada should beneﬁt from China’s
burgeoning demand for commodities and
skill-intensive goods and services.
he growing economic importance of China
has, in recent years, attracted the attention of
the international community and stimulated
intense debate. In the past year alone, discus-
sions have focused on China’s exchange rate regime;
its accumulation of significant foreign exchange
reserves; and the likelihood of a hard landing for the
Chinese economy. More recently, attention has focused
on the implications of a sharp slowdown in the coun-
try’s economic growth. The debates underscore the
extent to which China’s integration into the global
economy has already begun to affect the economies of
other countries, including Canada. These discussions
can be expected to intensify as the process of incorpo-
rating more than 1.3 billion people (about 20 per cent
of the world’s population) into the world economy
gathers momentum and further affects international
trade, capital ﬂows, and employment in both China
and the rest of the world.
Canada has a particular interest in the economic,
social, and political developments in China. In the
context of an increasingly globalized economy, China
represents an opportunity for Canadian industries in
some sectors and a formidable competitor to others.
As trade ﬂows become more globalized, Canadians
can expect relative prices to be affected. For example,
continued growth in China is likely to maintain
upward pressure on the price of Canada’s commodity
exports relative to the price of imported manufactured
goods. Similarly, it may affect the relative prices of
labour and capital in Canada, with the price of capital
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economy will be affected both directly and indirectly.1
Naturally, Canadian policy-makers are closely moni-
toring developments in China.
Between 1979 and 2003, the Chinese
economy expanded, on average, by
approximately 9.0 per cent per year,
3.0 percentage points higher than the
annual rate of economic growth
achieved before the economic reforms.
The emergence of China is not a recent phenomenon,
however. Indeed, over the past 25 years, as a result of
numerous reforms introduced since the end of the
1970s, China has gradually moved from a centrally
planned economy towards a “socialist market econ-
omy” capable of generating robust and sustainable
economicgrowth.Acknowledgingthelimitsofcentral
planning, Chinese authorities have increasingly relied
on market incentives to reallocate resources across
sectors and regions.
The results have been remarkable. Between 1979 and
2003, the Chinese economy expanded, on average, by
approximately 9.0 per cent per year, 3.0 percentage
points higher than the annual rate of economic growth
achieved before the economic reforms. This compares
with an average of approximately 2.9 per cent for
Canada over the same period.2 Empirical studies have
shown that, to a large extent, the acceleration of eco-
nomic growth in China reﬂects a better allocation of
resources across the economy, which, in turn, reﬂects
the impact of the reforms. In 1980, China was the
1. This inﬂuence will be felt, not only through bilateral trade between the two
countries, but also through changes in the prices of goods that Canada trades
via other countries, such as the United States. This is true of all trading econo-
mies. As a result, central bankers can increasingly be expected to pay close
attention to shocks (such as the impact on commodity prices) emanating from
China that may affect the domestic economy, especially prices. On the whole,
however, inﬂation targeting in the context of a ﬂexible exchange rate regime
has proven capable of ensuring that inﬂation rates stay close to their desired
levels, despite signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in relative prices.
2.  It is important to note that there is considerable and widespread skepti-
cism concerning the accuracy of China’s ofﬁcial GDP statistics. For example,
Young (2000) argues that the use of more appropriate GDP deﬂators reduces
China’s annual manufacturing growth over the period 1978 to 1998 to
6.1 per cent, from ofﬁcial estimates of 7.8 per cent.
ninth-largest country in the world in terms of gross
domestic product (GDP) at purchasing-power-parity
(PPP) exchange rates.3 Today, China is in second place,
behind the United States. Greater economic activity
has translated into significant social and economic
benefits, lifting about 400 million Chinese out of poverty.
Despite these signiﬁcant improvements in the level of
real economic activity, China remains, in per capita
terms, a low-income country. In 2002, for example, its
real income per capita was US$4,534, or 15 per cent of
that for Canada.4 Under certain assumptions, economic
theory suggests that per capita income levels of poor
countries should eventually catch up to the levels of
rich countries, implying that China’s economy should
continue to grow faster than the Canadian economy.
However, to sustain the process of convergence at cur-
rent rates, continued reforms will be required.
The purpose of this article is to understand the factors
that are driving China’s economic growth and to exam-
ineits implications for Canada. Research suggests that
the factors that have contributed to China’s growth
will probably continue to do so for some time, and that
new reforms are likely to reinforce the process. In
particular, the evidence reviewed here ﬁnds that the
introduction of market-based incentives has produced
a better allocation of resources (including the realloca-
tion of labour from agriculture to manufacturing),
resulting in substantial improvements in productivity
and growth. As the process of reform and resource
reallocation continues, driven by further trade liberali-
zation, the impact will increasingly be felt abroad. For
Canada, this may mean greater competition in labour-
intensive industries, and hence some downward pres-
sure on the wages of unskilled workers. On the other
hand, China’s growth is likely to increase the demand
for the skill-intensive goods and commodities in which
Canada has a comparative advantage. Canadian con-
sumers will also benefit from lower prices for imported
goods and services.
3. PPP exchange rates are constructed to permit international comparisons
across countries. Using PPP rates, a unit of a given currency (typically the U.S.
dollar) could purchase a similar bundle of goods in all countries.
4.  Data are measured at PPP exchange rates, using 2000 as the base year (IMF
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The Growth Process
A growth-accounting framework
Neo-classical growth theory offers an intuitive frame-
work5 with which to identify the main factors driving
China’s past growth and to assess its future potential.
Using this framework, growth is decomposed into three
components: contributions from labour, capital, and
technological change (i.e., changes in the efficiency
with which capital and labour are combined to gener-
ate output). Starting with the neo-classical production
function and adopting the standard notation and
assumptions, it is a straightforward matter to express
growth in output as follows:
where y, k, and l are rates of growth of GDP, capital,
and labour. Thus, y is the growth rate of the economy,
and the parameters, aK and aL, are, respectively, the
shares of capital and labour income in GDP. The ﬁrst
two terms on the right-hand side therefore capture the
components of GDP growth that result from growth in
the stocks of capital and labour. The catch-all term r
describes the proportional increase in growth that
would have occurred in the absence of any input
changes, such as the adoption of a new technology or
a better allocation of the existing stocks of capital and
labour across industries. This source of growth is
referred to as total-factor-productivity (TFP) growth.
While the contribution from capital and labour can be
directly estimated in empirical studies, TFP growth
must be inferred by subtracting from estimates of
GDP growth the components that result from the
accumulation of factors.
Several studies have attempted to measure the individ-
ual contributions of capital, labour, and TFP to China’s
growth during the past three decades (Table 1). The
results suggest that capital accumulation accounted
for the lion’s share during both the pre-reform and
reform periods, while the contribution of the labour
force has been modest, owing to its low marginal
product. This is a common ﬁnding in economies with
a surplus of labour. Accounting exercises aimed at
assessing the contribution of TFP to output growth in
5.  Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) made the seminal contribution to growth
theory upon which the growth-accounting framework and the analysis
employed here are based.
y aKk aLlr ++ =
China have produced a relatively wide range of esti-
mates, owing to differences in the assumed size of the
share of labour in GDP. The use of a lower labour share
implies a higher capital share, which magniﬁes the
contribution to growth of capital deepening. As a
result, lower estimates of labour’s share of GDP lead to
lower estimates of TFP growth. Most approaches,
however, yield similar conclusions about the relative
importance of each component to output growth dur-
ing the pre-reform and the reform periods. There is
general agreement in the literature that capital accu-
mulation and labour force expansion explain almost
all of China’s growth during the pre-reform period,
and that the contribution of TFP growth was either
small or negative (Chow 1993; Hu and Khan 1996).
In contrast, increases in total TFP growth have been
found to play a positive and significant role during
thereform period. Empirical estimates of its contri-
bution to output growth vary widely, from 2 to 5 per-
centage points a year, compared with estimates of
3 to 6 percentage points for capital accumulation and
0.5 to 1.5 percentage points for labour force growth.
Thus, given that GDP growth averaged 6 per cent a
year before the economic reforms and rose to 9 per
cent a year during the reform period, these results
suggest that TFP growth can explain most of the accel-
eration in output growth between the pre-reform and
reform periods. Most studies ﬁnd that the reform-
induced migration of labour out of agriculture played
a major role in generating this improvement in TFP
growth (see, for example, the findings of Heytens and
Zebregs [2003], reported in Table 2). To understand
how the reforms have contributed to this process, they
must be examined in more detail.
Growth rates (% p.a)
Output 5.8 9.3 9.4
Contribution to growth (%)a
Physical-capital input 3.8 4.2 3.5
Labour input 1.0 1.2 0.7
Human-capital input 0.8
Total-factor productivity 1.0 3.9 4.3
Table 1
Estimates of the Sources of China’s Growth
Hu and Khan World Bank
(1996) (1997)
1953–78 1979–94 1978–95
a. Given that percentages are rounded, it is possible that the numbers do not exactly add up.8 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2005
The Reforms
China’s economic and institutional reforms were
implemented in two successive phases. The main
objective of the first phase (1979–93) was to unleash
the beneficial impact of market forces by providing
greater incentives to economic agents, while protecting
existing vested interests. This was achieved through
a progressive decentralization of the economic deci-
sion-making process. In an effort to further reduce the
social impact of the reforms, the Chinese authorities
tried some of them out on a regional basis before
attempting a wider implementation of those that were
successful. The reform process can thus be character-
ized as gradual and experimental.
The second phase (since 1994) has been characterized
by the introduction of measures aimed atstrengthening
the effectiveness of market forces, which include reduc-
ing preferential treatments to certain companies in
order to level the playing field; introducing a more
transparent accounting framework for governments;
creating a central monetary authority; continuing the
reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs); establishing
the first stages of a social safety net; addressing the
issue of property rights and ownership; and, recently,
establishing an independent bank regulator (Qian 1999).
The agricultural sector and labour market
reforms
Before the reform process began, the Chinese agricul-
tural sector was communal, with production quotas
and prices administered by the central authorities.
Not surprisingly, signiﬁcant inefﬁciencies were associ-
ated with this system. For example, labourers were
remunerated according to the average production of
the commune, not according to their marginal product.
Moreover, there was little incentive for workers to
Total-factor productivity,
of which:a -0.53 2.78 2.11 2.81 2.30
Structural reform 0.38 0.94 0.76 0.83 0.39
Labour migration out
of primary sector 2.34 2.01 1.52 2.15 2.08
Exogenous trend -3.25 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17
Table 2
Estimates of Sources of TFP Growth in China
Heytens and Zebregs (2003)
1971–78 1979–94 1985–89 1990–94 1995–98
a. Given that percentages are rounded, it is possible that the numbers do not exactly add up.
relocate into other industries where their marginal
productivity may have beenhigher. Recognizing these
limitations, the authorities introduced the Household
ResponsibilitySystemin1979,whichallowedindividual
farmers to lease land from the commune in exchange
for a ﬁxed production quota (effectively, a lump-sum
tax). Production above the administered quota could
be sold in the market, resulting in a remuneration sys-
tem based on marginal productivity. This dual-track
system introduced market-based incentives.
In a sense, the introduction of the Household Respon-
sibility System can also be interpreted as a major labour
market reform because it forced a reassessment of the
value of labour. The more highly productive workers
increased farm production and income, while their less-
productive counterparts pursued employment oppor-
tunities outside the agricultural sector.
The reallocation of farmers with a
relatively low productivity level to
other employment opportunities was
pivotal to high TFP growth.
The new measures thus increased labour productivity
in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, the realloca-
tion of labourers with a relatively low level of produc-
tivity to other sectors where their productivity might
be higher should have increased the economy-wide
productivity level, or TFP. In theory, this process should
eventually result in an equalization of the marginal
productivity of labour (MPL) across industries. Chow
(1993) estimates that the MPL in the agricultural sector at
the beginning of the reform process was 63 yuan,
compared with 1,027yuanintheindustrialsector.This
figure suggests that the opportunity existed for a siza-
ble reallocation of labour within the Chinese economy.
Indeed, Brooks and Ran (2003) (among others) observe
that employment in the agricultural sector declined
substantially after thereforms were implemented, from
around 70 per cent of total employment to about 50 per
cent more recently. Heytens and Zebregs (2003) ﬁnd
that the reallocation of farmers with a relatively low
productivity level to other employment opportunities
was pivotal to high TFP growth (Table 2). Woo (1998)
and Young (2000) also note the importance of labour9 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2005
migration. Moreover, Brooks and Ran (2003) esti-
mate that, with approximately 150 million excess
workers in the agricultural sector (about 20 per cent of
total employment), there is still considerable scope for
further reallocation.
The non-agricultural, non-ﬁnancial sector
The industrial sector of the Chinese economy was the
natural recipient of the excess labour ﬂowing out of
the agricultural sector. In an effort to promote a better
allocation of labour and capital, the authorities imple-
mented three key market-oriented reforms to influence
the non-agricultural sector. First, reforms of the cap-
ital-intensive SOEs were introduced to expand their
autonomywithregardtoproduction,supply,marketing,
retained proﬁts, experimentation with new products,
and capital investment (Chow 2002). Under a new
Economic Responsibility System, firms were also
allowed to remunerate workers based on their pro-
ductivity. Furthermore, the dual-track system was
expanded to include industrial goods. Finally, while
maintaining ownership and control of major indus-
tries, the central government reduced its intervention
in the economy by moving loss-making SOEs to share-
holding companies. By weakening the link between
the SOEs and the government departments responsi-
ble for them, this policy reduced SOE access to govern-
ment revenues. This hardening of the SOEs’ budget
constraint, combined with a decentralization of the
economic decision-making process, is thought to have
resulted in a better internal allocation of resources,
thereby improving the marginal productivity of capi-
tal and labour and contributing to TFP growth.6
Second, the authorities successfully promoted the
growth of the non-state sector. As a result, despite
fundamental reforms of the SOEs, the non-state sector,
which is dominated by township and village enterprises
(TVEs), has been the most important contributor to
China’s outstanding economic performance. While
technically government enterprises, TVEs are generally
considered to be part of the non-state sector, reﬂecting
the limited ability of local and regional governments
to ﬁnance losses. TVEs thus function more as private,
proﬁt-seeking enterprises. In particular, given their
binding budget constraint, TVEs’ demand for labour
6.  As long as the marginal products of labour and capital are increased pro-
portionately, the labour and capital shares will remain unchanged, and
improvements in productivity from this reform will be reﬂected in increases
in TFP growth. Chow and Li (1999) ﬁnd evidence that the reforms have not
changed factor shares in China and hence provide some support for the argu-
ment that the Economic Responsibility System has improved TFP growth.
and capital is based on their marginal productivity.
Therefore, shifting existing resources to the non-state
sector (where productivity is presumably higher) has
led to a better allocation of resources across the econ-
omy, and an improvement in TFP growth.
Third, reducing barriers to foreign direct investment
(FDI) and developing open economic zones (OEZs)
that enjoy a more liberal investment and trade regime
than other areas, as well as special tax incentives,
created a market for labour-intensive manufactured
goods. In addition to contributing to the forces respon-
sible for drawing labour out of agriculture, these poli-
cies were also critical for attracting new technologies
and managerial know-how through FDI. The surge in
FDI has also resulted in a substantial increase in joint
ventures with foreigners and wholly foreign-owned
enterprises. As well as directly contributing to growth
through increased capital formation, the increase in
FDI is expected to have led to positive technological
spillover effects, resulting in an improvement in TFP
growth.7 Zebregs (2003) estimates that while FDI
directly contributed 0.4 percentage points to annual
GDP growth during the 1990s (through capital deep-
ening), its indirect contribution through long-term
TFP growth, at 2.5 percentage points, was much
higher.
Together, the agricultural and other economic reforms
have had a profound impact on the Chinese economy,
signiﬁcantly affecting the structure of both the rural
and urban labour markets (Table 3). The share of total
7.  Although this source of technology transfer is a potentially important
source of TFP growth, some analysts argue that China’s inward FDI is vastly
overstated, reﬂecting a problem of round-tripping. Krugman (1994) argues
that domestic investors send ﬁnancial capital offshore and then reinvest it in
China through a business partner in order to take advantage of favourable tax
concessions and other beneﬁts that accrue to foreign investors.
Urban employment 105.3 170.4 190.4 247.8
State (%) 76.2 60.7 59.1 30.3
Other (%) 23.8 39.3 40.9 69.7
Rural employment 318.4 477.1 490.3 489.6
TVEsa(%) 9.4 19.4 26.2 27.2
Other (%) 90.6 80.6 73.8 72.8
Table 3
Employment in China (millions)
1980 1990 1995 2002
a. Township and village enterprises
Source: Brooks and Ran (2003)10 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2005
urban employment accounted for by the state decreased
from 76.2 per cent in 1980 to 30.3 per cent in 2002.
During the same period, the share of rural employ-
ment accounted for by TVEs increased from 9.4 per cent
to 27.2 per cent. As a result of the migration of labour
between industries, the importance of the agricultural
sector in China has declined, from around 33.3 per cent
of GDP in 1981–82 to about 15.2 per cent. In turn, the
importance of the non-agricultural sector has increased
signiﬁcantly (Gordon and Gupta 2004).
Future Sources of Growth
Given China’s low per capita income, it is quite rea-
sonable to expect that its economic growth will con-
tinue at a signiﬁcant pace (Table 4). The question is, at
what rate, and for how long. The evidence presented
above suggests that China’s growth rate can be attrib-
uted to a number of important factors, beginning with
a high capital share in income. This, combined with its
high savings rate, has produced growth that is largely
the result of a process of capital deepening. But, clearly,
there are limits to this process. It is unlikely that such
a high savings rate can be sustained in the long term.
Moreover, as capital is accumulated, the marginal
product of capital will fall, resulting in a smaller
capital share and reducing the extent to which capital
accumulation can contribute to growth. Similarly,
labour’s contribution to growth will likely be con-
strained by the impact of China’s population-control
policies.
[China’s] high savings rate has
produced growth that is largely the
result of a process of capital
deepening. But, clearly, there are
limits to this process.
The second important source of growth has been
TFP growth, which, evidence suggests, has primarily
resulted from the reform process that produced a
better allocation of resources. Fortunately, as is dis-
cussed below, there is considerable room for further
reforms to continue this process. Four major sources
of TFP growth are likely to generate ongoing growth
over the foreseeable future. The ﬁrst is the continued
reallocation of labour from the agricultural sector to
manufacturing. Given the substantial supply of excess
labour in agriculture, there is still ample opportunity
for further growth through this channel alone.
Further reforms within the financial sector are expected
to help promote the second two sources of productivity
growth: a better reallocation of capital and increased
encouragement to invest. Recent intitutional legal
reforms that granted protection to private property
rightshaveprovided the foundation for the financial
reforms. Such laws can be expected to enable private
ﬁrms to use collateral assets as a means to obtain bank
financing, thereby providing the opportunity for banks
to increase the share of these relatively profitable private
firms in their loan portfolios, at the expense SOEs,
and producing a more efficient allocation of capital
across firms and industries and an additional stimu-
lus to investment.8 Through the creation ofa modern,
commercially oriented banking system, ﬁnancial
reforms can help to reduce the possibility of a debili-
tating ﬁnancial crisis that could stall both the growth
process and the reform process. An indication of the
urgency that the authorities are placing on financial
reform is the government’s commitment to the
World Trade Organization (WTO), which is beyond
that undertaken by other WTO members, to open the
banking sector to foreign competition by 2006. In addi-
tion, the Chinese government recently recapitalized the
Chinese banking system (in particular, two of the
major banks) with an injection of funds equivalent to
US$45 billion.
Trade reforms, such as further reductions in tariff and
non-tariff barriers in the agricultural, textiles and cloth-
ing, and service sectors and greater protection of intel-
lectual property rights, are expected to be the fourth
source of future TFP growth, through their impact on
8.  Private ownership and the rule of law were incorporated into the Chinese
Constitution in March 1999. In addition, China recently introduced a constitu-
tional amendment afﬁrming that “private property obtained legally shall not
be violated.” These reforms represent a tremendous development in a society
formerly constituted around the concept of property-less classes. The con-
cepts of property rights and ownership are fundamental to a market-based
economy.
IMF (2004) 7.6
Goldman Sachs (2003) 6.1
Heytens and Zebregs (2003) 7.5
Table 4
Projected Growth Rates of GDP in China
Estimates of average annual 2002–2020  2005–2020 2002–2020
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resource allocation. The development of the legal and
regulatory framework necessary for a market econ-
omy is likely to be spurred as China seeks to comply
with WTO rules.
Naturally, certain risks, both internal and external,
could slow China’s growth. There are two main sources
of domestic risk. First, the reform process could falter
if the adoption of new reforms becomes politically
challenging, or if the beneﬁts of reform diminish con-
siderably; and second, given the fragility of the bank-
ing system, the potential exists for a ﬁnancial crisis to
significantly interrupt the growth process.9 In addition
to internal risks, as the world’s third-largest trading
nation, China now faces a number of external risks to
growth. From a purely economic perspective, the ben-
eﬁts of the export-led growth strategy could be partly
offset by a worsening of China’s terms of trade. From
a political perspective, protectionist pressure could
mount among China’s trading partners if China is not
seen to be doing its part to alleviate global imbalances.
Despite these risks, however, most analysts agree that
China will continue to grow at a reasonable rate over
the foreseeable future, with potentially signiﬁcant
implications for the rest of the world.
China’s Economic Integration
How China’s growth affects the rest of the world
depends on the extent of its economic integration
and the nature of its economic linkages. The integra-
tion process is complex, involving a web of economic,
ﬁnancial, and political linkages. This section focuses
on the trade and ﬁnancial aspects of China’s integra-
tion; other potentially important channels, such as
migration ﬂows and non-economic linkages, are not
considered.
According to the WTO, China is now the world’s
third-largest trading nation (after the United States
and Germany). In 2003, at US$438.4 billion and
US$412.8 billion, its trade accounted for 5.9 per cent
and 5.3 per cent of world exports and imports, respec-
9.  According to ofﬁcial estimates, non-performing loans (NPLs) account for
over 18 per cent of total assets. However, private sector estimates put the
share of NPLs to bank assets at more than double the ofﬁcial ﬁgure (Standard
& Poor’s 2004). Given the precarious ﬁnancial system, it is possible that
depositors could lose conﬁdence in the government’s guarantee, leading to a
major banking crisis that could seriously damage the economy. The Chinese
authorities have recognized the weak capital position of the banking sector
and have introduced a number of measures to improve the situation, in par-
ticular, the reforms aimed at reducing political interventions in the determi-
nation of successful loan applicants. They have also injected considerable
sums of money to recapitalize the banking sector.
tively. In comparison, Canada’s trade is considerably
smaller, with exports and imports of US$272.1 billion
and US$245.6 billion, respectively. Moreover, while
Canada’s trade with the rest of the world grew by
approximately 8 per cent in 2003, China’s trade grew
at a rate in excess of 35 per cent (Box 1).10
China’s rise as a major trading nation is a relatively
recent phenomenon. Before the reforms, China’s trade
with the rest of the world was highly restricted, and
whatever trade occurred was the outcome of the State
Planning Commission’s export and import plans.
Under these trade plans, China’s imports were largely
ﬁnanced from the proceeds of its petroleum exports
(Lardy 2002). Thus, in 1985, China accounted for less
than 2 per cent of world trade, with petroleum exports
accounting for more than 28 per cent of China’s
exports, and manufacturing exports accounting for
less than half.
With the abandonment of the trade plans, China’s
trade pattern changed to reﬂect market signals and
comparative advantages. As a result, its reliance on
primary sector exports fell considerably, and exports
of manufactured goods grew (Chart 1). Moreover,
10.  Because of its rapid trade expansion, China has become a relatively open
economy; measured as a percentage of merchandise trade (exports plus
imports) relative to GDP, China’s openness to trade was 60.25 per cent in 2003
(IMF 2004), which is close to the ﬁgure for Canada (approximately 59 per cent,
by IMF ﬁgures).
Chart 1
Sectoral Composition of China’s Exports
1985–2000












1985 1990 1995 2000
Travel goods, handbags, and footwear
Electrical equipment
Apparel and clothing accessories
Agriculture and mining
Computers and telecom-
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Trade between Canada and China has grown at a
brisk pace over the past decade.1 Since 1995, Cana-
dian exports to China have grown by roughly 40
per cent, and totalled about Can$4.8 billion at the
end of 2003. Canadian imports from China have
expanded at an even faster pace, quadrupling since
1995, and totalling Can$18.6 billion in 2003. As a
result, China is now the second-largest source of
imports for Canada, having surpassed Japan and
Mexico. Like many countries, Canada is running a
sizable trade deficit (Can$13.8 billion in 2003) with
China.
The composition of Canada’s exports to China also
evolved signiﬁcantly during the past decade, as
they became more diversiﬁed. While wheat
accounted for 60 per cent of Canada’s exports in
1992, this proportion fell to only 10 per cent in 2003,
supplanted by industrial materials and forestry
products which, in 2003, accounted for 45 per cent
and 24 per cent, respectively.2 As a large net
exporter of resources, Canada has beneﬁted
directly from China’s growing appetite for Cana-
dian raw materials and indirectly through recent
upward pressure on commodity prices owing, in
part, to strong Chinese demand. The range of
Chinese goods being imported has also expanded
1.   This sections draws substantially on Roy (2004).
2.  The share of our exports to China accounted for by capital goods has
remained at a stable 11 per cent over the past decade.
rapidly. While Canadian imports from China dur-
ing the mid-1990s consisted primarily of toys and
trinkets, our demand for capital goods has soared
in recent years, and they surpassed consumer
goods in Canadian imports in early 2004. Electronic
equipment and mechanical machinery now domi-
nate our imports of capital goods from China.
Canadian direct investment in China covers a
broad range of key sectors, including aerospace,
biotechnology, education, ﬁnance, information
technology, manufacturing, and natural resources.
However, the overall level of direct investment is
relatively small, totalling about Can$542 million in
2003 (or less than 1 per cent of total Canadian FDI).
In the ﬁnancial sector, the exposure of Canadian
banks to China is very small (it stood at Can$865
million in the second quarter of 2004, which repre-
sents less than 0.5 per cent of the foreign assets of
Canadian banks). Nevertheless, the Bank of Mon-
treal and the Bank of Nova Scotia have established
branches in China,3 and the insurance ﬁrms Manu-
life and Sunlife are also operating there. Canadian
banks and insurance companies are likely to
expand their Chinese operations as China’s WTO
commitment leads to a further opening of these
sectors to foreign ﬁrms and to increased demand
for sophisticated financial products.
3.  In 2002, the Bank of Nova Scotia and the World Bank Financial Corpo-
ration acquired a 1 per cent participation in a Chinese bank.
BOX 1
Understanding Canada’s Commercial and Financial Links with China
aside from trade liberalization, it is likely that the
reform process also changed China’s comparative
advantage. Reforms that improve property rights tend
to encourage capital accumulation and lower the costs
of capital-intensive production. Thus, it is not surprising
that, while China remains very much a labour-abundant
country exporting predominantly labour-intensive
goods, the range of goods that it exports has become
considerably more sophisticated over time (Desroches,
Francis, and Painchaud 2004; henceforth DFP).
It is likely that the reform process also
changed China’s comparative
advantage. Reforms that improve
property rights tend to encourage
capital accumulation and lower the
costs of capital-intensive production.13 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2005
DFP (2004) also found that the changing pattern of
comparative advantage is gradually having a signiﬁ-
cant impact on Canada, as is illustrated in Chart 2.
Products are ranked from least sophisticated to most
sophisticated along the horizontal axis, and the share
of each product in a given country’s total exports is
plotted against the vertical axis.11 This gives a distri-
bution of each country’s total exports ranked by their
sophistication. For comparison, we provide two sets
of charts. In Chart 2a, we plot the export distributions
for China and Canada as of 1985; in Chart 2b, we plot
them using 2001 export data. The charts illustrate that
while, in 1985, China exported goods that were gener-
ally less sophisticated than Canadian goods, by 2001
there had been a signiﬁcant rightward shift in its dis-
tribution, such that its exports now overlapped with
Canadian exports, especially in goods of middle levels
of sophistication.12 Thus, while China’s exports were
once complementary to Canada’s, by 2001 there were
clearly some areas in which they had become competi-
tors. DFP (2004) provide evidence that increased trade
with China is contributing positively to Canada’s
growth. Moreover,Canada’sresponsetothisincreased
competitioninproductsofmiddle-levelsophistication
has been a consolidation of exports in relatively more
sophisticated goods. Intra-industry trade, where a
country imports and exports goods from within the
same industry, is another important aspect of China’s
trade.13 It is generally thought that this trade reﬂects
vertical intra-industry trade effects, with China
importing unﬁnished goods, primarily from other
Asian economies such as Hong Kong and Taiwan;
engaging in the labour-intensive activity of process-
ing and packaging these goods; and then exporting
11. Following Kwan (2002), the product sophistication index (PSI) for a given
good is measured as the average real per capita income of the countries that
export this type of good, weighted by their share in the global market for that
good. That is, for good j and countries i,
,
where xijis country i’s share of global exports of good j, and Yi is the real per
capita GDP of country i.
12. Using the PSI and export data, DFP (2004) calculate a global ladder of com-
parative advantage that ranks 115 countries in terms of the average level of
sophistication of their exports. They ﬁnd that, between 1985 and 2001, China’s
ranking rose from 55 to 41. Canada was ranked 16th in 2001, down from 10th
in 1985.
13.  This trade is particularly apparent in sectors such as electronics and
electrical equipment. For example, in terms of value, electrical machinery,
apparatus, and appliances constitute China’s most important import sector
(accounting for 26 per cent of merchandise imports). However, in 2000, it was
also China’s second-largest export sector (10 per cent of merchandise
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the final product, often to the United States (Prasad
and Rumbaugh 2003).14
While China is becoming increasingly integrated into
the world economy through trade ﬂows, restrictions
on capital flows limit both the opportunities for foreign-
ers to invest in Chinese assets and for Chinese residents
to invest abroad. Only a limited number of Chinese
firms, for example, are permitted to raise equity capital
from foreigners by issuing so-called “B-listed” shares
on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges; and
while some issuance of international debt instruments
is permitted, it is restricted and small. The main source
of international capital is foreign direct investment
(FDI) (Chart 3). Restrictions on this form of inward
investment are much weaker, so while portfolio invest-
ment is relatively small, at US$62 billion in 2004, China
is the second-largest recipient of FDI, after the United
States, which attracted US$121 billion in 2004. This
large number reﬂects, in part, market size. China’s
FDI, relative to GDP, has averaged around 4 per cent
over the past ﬁve years, a ﬁgure comparable to other
emerging markets, such as Brazil (Chart 4).
Although there has been some ﬁnancial integration
through FDI, China’s integration into world capital
markets has principally occurred through the acquisi-
tion of foreign assets (mostly U.S. Treasury instruments)
by its central bank. The accumulation of international
reserves reflects China’s fixed exchange rate policy,
which has resulted in persistent current account sur-
pluses since the exchange rate was pegged at its cur-
rent rate in 1995. Typically, a fixed exchange rate that
results in ongoing sizable current account surpluses in
developing countries is considered undervalued.
Indeed, economists generally argue that countries in
their early stages of development need to import capi-
tal from the rest of the world to ﬁnance their rapid
pace of investment growth. As a consequence, most
developing countries should run current account deﬁ-
cits if their exchange rates are appropriately aligned
with market fundamentals. Thus, China’s exchange
rate policy can be thought of as contributing to its
export-led growth strategy. It may also reﬂect a desire
to accumulate substantial reserves, which the Chinese
authorities may deem necessary to ensure against a
14.  This development has contributed to the decline in the share of exports
from other Asian countries to the United States. In contrast, consistent with
China’s increasing role in the production chain, a rising share of China’s
imports comes from within the region, and Chinese exports to the United
States have risen at a brisk pace. As a consequence, China’s share of U.S.
imports has increased dramatically.
ﬁnancial crisis along the lines of the one experienced
by other Asian economies in 1997–98.15
While some benefits flow from the current exchange
rate regime, there are also signiﬁcant costs. An under-
valued exchange rate, for example, increases the cost
to Chinese households and ﬁrms of consumption and
15.  Most economists are agreed, however, that at current levels in excess of
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investment goods, reducing domestic absorption. Fur-
thermore, the foreign reserves could presumably have
been more productively invested within the Chinese
economy itself. In addition, the export-led growth strat-
egy could be diverting too much investment towards
the export sector, which may turn out to be unproﬁta-
ble if the real exchange rate is revalued.
While some beneﬁts ﬂow from the
current exchange rate regime, there
are also signiﬁcant costs. An
undervalued exchange rate, for
example, increases the cost to Chinese
households and ﬁrms of consumption
and investment goods, reducing
domestic absorption.
China’s high savings rate may also be important in
explaining China’s current account surplus. Since
Chinese residents save about 40 per cent of their income,
the country’s savings could outstrip investment, pro-
ducing a current account surplus. In order for the
balance of payments to balance, an accumulation of
foreign assets is therefore required. However, since
private agents are generally not permitted to purchase
foreign assets, an ofﬁcial agency, such as the central
bank, must acquire them. While this process also acts
to maintain the pegged exchange rate (whenever the
current account is in surplus), it also permits China to
use some of its national savings to accumulate claims
on foreign assets. As China relaxes the restrictions on
capital account transactions and eventually moves its
economy towards a more ﬂexible exchange rate sys-
tem, China is expected to become much more highly
integrated with world capital markets. The relaxation
of capital controls will provide Chinese ﬁrms (espe-
cially those engaged in international trade) with better
access to foreign capital markets. It will also allow
Chinese residents (rather than the central bank) to
diversify their considerable savings and invest in for-
eign markets, including, for example, the equities
markets in industrialized countries. Such increased
integration will lead to a better diversiﬁcation of glo-
bal risks, as well as a better allocation of global capital.
Implications for the World Economy
According to estimates by the International Labour
Organization, China has roughly 25 per cent (close to
800 million people) of the world’s economically active
population. In contrast, in 1980, when the newly indus-
trialized Asian economies were in the early stages of
their growth process, their population represented
about 1.5 per cent of the global population. The global
economy is thus facing a potential adjustment challenge
of an entirely different magnitude. Furthermore, the
size of the labour force and the low starting point of
the capital-to-labour ratio suggest that the shock will
be both signiﬁcant and persistent. Given China’s size
and already extensive trade links, its signiﬁcant com-
mitments to further open its trade and investment flows
as a member of the WTO will ensure that its growth
has important effects on the global economy, the
scale of which the world may not have previously
experienced.
As the opportunities for trade spread
westward from the coastal regions
and provinces, millions more Chinese
will be integrated into the world
economy and will enjoy the beneﬁts of
a higher standard of living.
The major beneficiary of further integration and reform
willbeChinaitself.Astheopportunitiesfortradespread
westward from the coastal regions and provinces, mil-
lions more Chinese will be integrated into the world
economy and will enjoy the beneﬁts of a higher stand-
ard of living. Moreover, the beneﬁts of future reforms
are likely to be magniﬁed in a more open economy
(DFP 2004).
For the rest of the world, including Canada, China’s
emergence and integration into the world economy
offer the prospect of substantial net benefits. One
important beneﬁt, of course, is that it will result in a
more efﬁcient allocation of resources on a global scale.
China’s greater openness to trade and investment
imply that production activities will continue to be
shifted to sectors in which China has a comparative
advantage. Moreover, increased competition from
China is likely to enhance global competition, foster-16 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2005
ing innovation and contributing to greater productiv-
ity gains and, hence, higher long-run growth rates, not
only in China, but globally. While these effects are dif-
ﬁcult to quantify, they could be substantial.
At the same time, China’s integration into the world
economy will have terms-of-trade effects for other
trading nations. For example, the expansion of output
in China has been widely cited as contributing to the
recent increase in the demand for commodities and
putting upward pressure on commodity prices. This
process may continue over the near term, producing
signiﬁcant gains for resource-rich economies. The rela-
tive price of capital-intensive goods and services is
also likely to increase as China’s domestic demand
increases. By implication, the relative price of manu-
factured goods will likely fall on world markets as a
result of a large increase in their supply from China.
Indeed, there is some evidence that China’s rapid
productivity growth has already led to sharp declines
in the prices of some globally traded goods in which
China specializes (IMF 2003). While the beneﬁts asso-
ciated with an increase in global demand from China’s
growth and integration are generally positive for
industrialized and resource-rich countries like Canada,
the terms-of-trade and welfare effects for some labour-
abundant developing countries like Indonesia and the
Philippines may be negative (Table 5).
As a net exporter of commodities and a net importer
of labour-intensive manufactured goods, Canada
would be expected to experience an improvement in
its terms of trade, all else being equal. The total effect
on Canada is expected to be positive since, in addition
to greater demand for skill- and capital-intensive
goods and services, Canada will beneﬁt directly from
increased opportunities for exporting primary com-
modities directly to China, and indirectly through
higher prices for these products, owing to China’s
impact on global demand. Indeed, higher demand
could be expected to strengthen demand for the
Canadian dollar. In the long run, the integration of
China’s economy into the world economy implies a
better allocation of global resources and, hence, a
higher and more sustainable global growth path.
However, over the short term, the adjustment phase
will present policy-makers both inside and outside
of China with some challenges. Some reallocation of
labourandcapitalinresponsetochangingcomparative
advantage and terms of trade among trading nations
may be necessary. For some economies, especially
those specialized in low-skilled, labour-intensive
exports, such changes may involve considerable adjust-
ment costs as uncompetitive enterprises are closed
and unemployment rises temporarily in the home
country (Prasad and Rumbaugh 2003). In addition,
during the transition phase, low-skilled workers inthe
industrialized countries may experience a slower
increase in wages, or even a decline, as the increase in
theworld’seffectivelabourforceassociatedwithChina’s
emergence leads to a decline in the world’s capital-to-
labour ratio and an increase in the returns to capital.
Conclusion
China is the world’s most populous economy. It is also
the world’s fastest growing large economy. If current
trends continue, by 2020, China could conceivably
account for one-quarter of global GDP. In the interim,
China’s emergence and integration will require the
rest of the global economy to adjust to its rise. For
Canada, this is likely to involve, not only increased
competition in some of its labour-intensive products,
but increased demand for those products in which
Canada has a comparative advantage: commodities
and human-capital-intensive goods and services, in
particular. On balance, Canada can expect to beneﬁt
from China’s growth and integration. Indeed, if there
is any signiﬁcant risk to the Canadian economy, it is
most likely to occur in the form of a sudden halt in the
process of Chinese growth.
World 3 5.3 7.4 7.2 0.0
China 126.1 86.6 85.7 -7.0
Advanced economies 0.1 2.3 2.7 0.7
NIE (newly
industrialized economies) 0.2 2.2 2.9 0.5
ASEAN4 0.0 0.9 0.5 -0.1
South Asia -0.2 0.1 -2.3 -1.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.4 0.2 0.8 1.4
Mexico, Colombia,
and Venezuela 0.1 -0.7 -1.2 0.3
Other western hemisphere
countries 0.2 2.5 2.8 0.9
Middle East and North Africa 0.7 -0.8 0.4 1.9
Rest of the world 0.1 1.3 0.6 0.4
Table 5
Trade-Related Impact of Faster Chinese Integration,
20201
Welfare 2 Exports Imports Terms
of Trade
1. As percentage deviation from the values prevailing in the slow-Chinese-integration
scenario
2. Welfare is defined as the equivalent variation, relative to GDP.
3. F.o.b. prices for exports, and c.i.f. prices for imports. The discrepancy between changes in
exports and in imports reflects transport costs.
4. Association of South East Asian Nations, including Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indo-
nesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Source: IMF (2004)17 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2005
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